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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Federal Income Taxation-The Ups and Downs of the Education
Expense Deduction
INTRODUCTION

Each year an increasing number of men and women in the United
States are returning to college or business school in order to improve
themselves in their chosen field of endeavor or to fulfill a requirement
1
of their employer. Under the present Treasury regulations some
are allowed to deduct the costs of this additional education as an
"ordinary and necessary" expense incurred in the carrying on of their
trade or business, while others are not. Because of the close line
which has been drawn, it is often difficult for a taxpayer to decide if
his educational expenses fall into the deductible or non-deductible
category.2
The objective of this discussion is to trace the development of the
education expense deduction and to look at the present day application of the so-called "liberalized" regulations' by the Internal Revenue
Service and our courts.
THE HILL CASE
Prior to 1950 there was virtually no deduction for education
expenses except in fringe areas.4 These deductions were disallowed
5
by the courts on the ground of being either personal expenses or
'Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958).
2Generally the costs incurred for undergraduate college education and
basic professional training have never been deductible, and this comment is
not a discussion of this point. See Louis Aronin, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 993
(1961); Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956 (1950); Lewis v. Commissioner, 8
T.C. 770, af'd, 164 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947); T. F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A.
1008 (1926); J. D. Bowles, 1 B.T.A. 584 (1925). But ef. Michaelson v.
United States, 203 F. Supp. 830 (D. Wash. 1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d 668 (9th
Cir. 1963).
' Supra note 1.
"Alexander Silverman, 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927) (college chemistry department head allowed deduction for attending scientific convention); Marion D.
Shutter, 2 B.T.A. 23 (1925). Physicians were allowed to deduct expenses
incurred while attending meetings and conventions of medical societies, but
there is no definite indication that they were of an educational nature. See
Robert C. Coffey, 21 B.T.A. 1242 (1931); Cecil M. Jack, 13 B.T.A. 726
(1928).
'James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603 (1944) (no deduction allowed professor
for doing scholarly research); T. F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926) (no
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non-depreciable assets.
The first significant break-through in this area came in the case
of Nora Payne Hill.7 The taxpayer was a school teacher who was
required by state law to renew her teaching certificate every ten years.
In order to meet this requirement she had to pass an examination on
five books or complete three hours of college credit in courses which
were acceptable to the school board. She chose the latter. This
choice did not increase her salary since she was already receiving
the maximum allowed. The taxpayer claimed a deduction for the
expenses which she incurred on account of attending college. 8 She
argued that the expenses were ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in conducting her trade or business as a teacher in the public
schools. She contended that the additional education made it possible
for her to meet the requirements of the state law regarding renewal
of her teaching certificate and helped her to sharpen the tools of her
trade, i.e., to maintain, not to better, the status which she had already
achieved.
The Commissioner contended that the costs incurred by the taxpayer were personal in nature and not "ordinary and necessary"'
business expenses. He relied on a 1921 Office Decision,1 0 stating
that costs incurred by teachers attending summer school were personal and non-deductible, and on the Treasury regulations then in
force. 1
deduction for voice lessons anticipating professional engagements); Jay N.
Darling, 4 B.T.A. 499 (1926) (no deduction allowed cartoonist for incidental
expenses while studying sculpturing).
The Commissioner acquiesced in this position at all times. O.D. 984, 5
Cum. BULL. 171 (1921) (expenses incurred by doctors in taking postgraduate courses are personal); O.D. 892, 4 Cumv. BULL. 209 (1921) (expenses of teachers attending summer school are personal). See also Treas.
Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-15(b) (1943); Treas. Reg. 103, §19.23(a)-15(b)

(1940).

'This idea came about by way of dictum in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111 (1933), where Justice Cardozo said: "Reputation and learning are akin to
capital assets,.... .For many, they are the only tools with which to hew a
pathway to success. The money spent in acquiring them is well and wisely
spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of a business." Id. at
115-16.
13 T.C. 291 (1949).
'The deduction claimed was for room rent, traveling expense, tuition, and
the estimated difference between cost of living at school and at home.
°For good discussions of the legal definition of an "ordinary" expense see
Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
" O.D. 892, 4 Cum.BULL. 209 (1921).
"1Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-15(b) (1943).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

19631

The Tax Court held for the Commissioner. The court stated that
the taxpayer had not overcome the presumptively correct determination by the Commissioner that the expense was a personal one. The
inference was made that since the taxpayer's certificate had expired
she might not have been "employed" at the time she took the summer
school courses, but rather incurred the expense to qualify for reemployment. The court also stated that for an expense to be
"ordinary" it must be one of common or frequent occurrence in the
particular occupation. In this instance it could not be assumed that
teachers ordinarily attend summer school to obtain a renewal of their
certificates when another method was available, i.e., passing an
examination on five books.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.'" The court said
that "clearly, the very logic of the situation here shows that she went
to Columbia to maintain her present position, not to attain a new
position; to preserve, not to expand or increase; to carry on, not to3
commence. Any other view seems to us unreal and hypercritical."'
Thus, as a result of Hill, deductions for educational expenses
were allowed if the education was undertaken to enable the taxpayer
to meet a requirement necessary for the maintenance of his present
position. However, once it appeared that the taxpayer was seeking
to attain a new position, the deduction was to be disallowed.
THE TREND FOLLOWING HILL

After Hill the Commissioner promulgated I.T. 4044's which
modified the old 1921 Office Decision and allowed Hill to be followed
where the facts were similar. This ruling stated that where a
teacher incurred expenses in order to maintain her position, they
would be deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
However, where the expenses were "incurred for the purpose of obtaining a teaching position, or qualifying for permanent status, a
higher position, an advance in the salary schedule, or to fulfill the
general cultural aspirations of the teacher,"' 5 they will be deemed
personal expenses and not deductible.
In Manoel Cardozo'0 the Tax Court was called on to apply the
guidelines set out in Hill and in I.T. 4044. Here, the taxpayer, a
Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
1951-1 CuM. BULL.

'2

added.)
Id. at 909. (Emphasis
16.
1
1

Id. at 17.

o17 T.C. 3 (1951).
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university professor, took a trip to Europe for the purpose of study
and research. It was not necessary for him to take this trip in order
to retain his position at the university. Indeed, the petitioner himself
contended that the trip was undertaken to better equip himself to
perform the duties of his present employment, to increase his prestige,
and to attract opportunities in the fields of scholarship and education
by improving his reputation for scholarship and learning. The court
stated that neither Hill nor I.T. 4044 would allow the deduction
asked for by the taxpayer.1 7 The fact was stressed that Hill required
the taxpayer to incur the expenses either to maintain, preserve, or
carry on his present position. Since the taxpayer in this instance was
not requiredto make the trip for any of these purposes, the deduction
was not allowed."8
In George G. Coughlin.'9 the petitioner was an attorney who
handled tax matters in the course of his general practice. He claimed
a business expense deduction for expenses incurred while attending
the New York University Institute on Federal Taxation. The Tax
Court denied the deduction because the taxpayer's objective was of
a personal nature. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in reversing2 ° indicated that the situation presented was analogous to Hill.
" Neither is a deduction allowed in connection with travel and study expenses incurred by a teacher on sabbatical leave unless the undertaking is
required by the school for the maintenance of the teacher's position. Rev.
Rul. 55-412, 1955 Cum. BuLL. 318.
"In Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956, 958 (1950), the taxpayer agreed that
the studies for which the deduction was claimed increased his earning capacity,
and this, said the court, was enough to distinguish the case from Hill.
The court said: "Thus, whether the expenses were undertaken as purely personal matters to improve petitioner's education and cultural attainments or in
order to achieve improvement in his professional status ... the result would
be identical."
See Samuel W. Marshall, Jr., 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 797 (1955), where
the deduction was disallowed for music lessons to qualify the taxpayer for
a position as a music teacher. This question was not raised on appeal.
240 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1957). In Rhonda Fennell, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
460 (1953), a deduction was allowed for expenses incurred by a librarian
who, because of a ruling made by the Tennessee State Board of Education,
had to have additional credits in library science courses to retain her position
when the school in which she was employed exceeded a certain average daily
attendance. See also Richard Henry Lampkin, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 507
(1952) (no deduction allowed for expenses incurred in connection with a
doctor's dissertation); Fred A. DeCain, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 535 (1951)
(no deduction for trips of an educational nature).
18 T.C. 528 (1952). Four judges dissented without opinion.
Goughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953). Also see
Co
Anthony E. Spitaleri, 32 T.C. 988 (1959) (no deduction for expenses incurred by a practicing accountant to take a law school correspondence
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The court felt that the only difference between the two cases was
in the degree of necessity which prompted the incurrence of the
expenditures. The court stated:
It was a way well adapted to fulfill his professional duty to
keep sharp the tools he actually used in his going trade or
business. It may be that the knowledge he thus gained incidentally increased his fund of learning in general and, in that
sense, the cost of acquiring it may have been a personal expense; but . . . the immediate, over-all professional need to

incur the expenses in order to perform his work with due
regard to the current status of the law so overshadows the
personal aspect that it is the decisive feature.2 '
In Robert M. Kamins" the taxpayer, who had been hired as an
instructor by a university on a year to year basis, attempted to
deduct a portion of the cost of getting a doctorate degree. The understanding between the taxpayer and his employer was that he would
substantially complete his qualifications for a doctorate degree before
a permanent contract of employment would be offered. Nevertheless,
the taxpayer was appointed to a permanent position before completing the necessary prerequisite. In arguing for the allowance
of the deduction, the taxpayer contended that he was in fact "maintaining" his position as set forth in Hill and I.T. 4044, and that the
requirement of completing his doctorate was a condition subsequent
to the attaining of the teaching position. The Tax Court disallowed
the deduction. In its opinion it referred to a letter from a university
official which stated that the degree was essential to the retention
of the position. The court stated that even though the taxpayer was
hired on a permanent basis before completion of his work, still,
he was not fully and completely established in his chosen profession
until he attained the doctorate degree. On this latter ground the
case was distinguished from Hill.2"
course); Musser v. United States, 1957-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9603 (N.D.
Cal.) (deduction allowed for expenses incurred in attending a professional
seminar).
21 Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1953).
2225 T.C. 1238 (1956).
" In Richard Seibold, 31 T.C. 1017 (1959), both husband and wife were
school teachers. The husband held a permanent certificate permitting him
to teach music, and his wife held a temporary certificate to teach the same
subject. Both taxpayers took a European trip which included a two week
course at the University of Geneva. The husband did not attend the course
but was given two hours of credit toward his inservice requirement upon the
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In Clark S. Marlor2 4 the petitioner was hired as a tutor by the
Board of Education of New York City. The board had a rule which
provided that a tutor who did not meet the requirements for the
position of instructor within five years from the date of his appointment would neither be eligible for promotion to the rank of instructor
nor eligible for reappointment as a tutor. To meet this requirement
a tutor had to demonstrate substantial progress toward a Ph.D.
degree. In 1952 the petitioner claimed a deduction for expenses incurred in progressing towards his Ph.D. and contended that he incurred the expenses to retain his position as a tutor. The Tax Court,
with three judges dissenting, upheld the Commissioner's contention
that he expended the money in order to qualify himself for a higher
rank. The dissent expressed the position that the expenditures were
made for a dual purpose, i.e., to qualify for a permanent position
and to retain his temporary appointment, with the latter of the objectives being the more immediate. Thus, the petitioner's position is
supported by Hill. In a per curiam reversal, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals said it agreed in all respects with the dissenting
opinion of the Tax Court.25
submission by him of a detailed report indicating the places he visited on
the trip and his ideas of the benefits he attained from the trip. The Tax
Court in rejecting the deduction of the husband's expenses said that this was
merely a sightseeing trip and was not an "ordinary" way for a teacher to
earn credit hours towards a requirement even though it was a permissible
way. The court also pointed out that he did not take the trip essentially to
secure the credits since he could have gotten three times the number of credit
hours allowed him for no additional cost simply by attending the course at
Geneva University. The wife attained six hours of credit by attending the
course at Geneva, and she later went on to attain additional credits which
together with the credits received at Geneva allowed her to obtain a permanent teaching certificate. In denying the deduction both for the trip to
Geneva and the additional costs incurred in attaining the certificate, the
court said she made the expenditures in order to acquire a position which
she had never held before, i.e., a permanent one. For this reason the court
indicated that her situation was analogous to that of the taxpayer in Kamitts
and not Hill as was contended.
' 27 T.C. 624 (1956).
" Marlor v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958). In Robert S.
Green, 28 T.C. 1154 (1957), a deduction was allowed where the taxpayer
was required by the local board of education to take additional college
courses to maintain her advanced standing. The court was unconcerned with
the fact that the taxpayer combined these courses with others in later
obtaining a masters degree which led to a pay raise.
In Bistline v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 802 (D. Idaho 1956), the
taxpayer was allowed a $435.20 deduction on his 1948 return for unreimbursed
travel expenses, hotel costs, and costs for tuition and books to attend a two
week course in federal taxation in New York City. The issue of this deduction was not raised on appeal. 260 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1958).
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THE NEW REGULATIONS UNDER THE

1954

CODE

The discussion up to this point has involved only cases which
arose under the 1939 Code. With the enactment of the 1954 Code,
a change took place in the education expense deduction area.
To understand the reason for the change which occurred, we
must look to the Commissioner's new regulations. 6 This set of
regulations was promulgated in 1958 and made to apply retroactively
to all 1954 Code years.2 7 They came about mainly as a result of
pressure being put on Congress for legislative action in this area.28
At the time of their promulgation, a bill, extremely liberal in nature
(although affecting only teachers), was pending before Congress.2 9
When the Treasury Department announced the new regulations, the
sponsor of the pending legislation stated that they obviated the
necessity of enacting his bill.3 ' These regulations were hailed as a
"liberalization" of the policy governing education expenses, and it
was estimated by the National Education Association that they would
3
save teachers alone $20 million annually. '
These regulations provide in part as follows:
(a) Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are
deductible if they are for education (including research activities) undertaken primarily for the purpose of:
(1) Maintaining or improving skills required by the
taxpayer in his employment or other trade or business, or
(2) Meeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's
employer, or the requirements of applicable law or regulations,
imposed as a condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his

salary, status or employment.
As we shall see, the genuine "liberalization" which the taxpayers
expected from these regulations was not to be forthcoming. Instead,
2 'Treas.

Reg. § 1.162-5 (1959).

Amendments Act of 1958, § 96, 72 Stat. 1606, 1672.
' NEA News Bulletin, May 1958, p. 13, col. 2.
20H.R. 4662, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). This proposed legislation
would have allowed a teacher to deduct expenses paid during the taxable
year for the furtherance of his education. This deduction would have been
limited to $600 per annum and would have been a deduction from adjusted
gross income. Such a deduction was not to be allowed under this section if
it was allowable as a trade or business expense deduction under Section
162 of the 1954 Code.
o NEA News Bulletin, supra note 28.
'lIbid.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1959).
'Technical
8
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due to the Commissioner's strict and narrow construction of these
innovations, the question of educational expenses has become one
of the more litigated in the federal income tax field.
NEw REGULATIONS
was the first case to arise under these new reguJohn S.
lations. The taxpayer, a physician who specialized in internal
medicine, used "psychosomatic medicine" in his practice. After
practicing for a few years, he decided to obtain further training in
psychiatry. The training was undertaken on a completely voluntary basis and did not lead to any additional degree or certificate.
The taxpayer contended that it would enable him to do a better job of
practicing internal medicine. The Commissioner in contesting the
deduction allowance argued that the taxpayer had not proven it to
be customary34 for a specialist of internal medicine to undertake a
course of this type.
The Tax Court in allowing the deduction"' stated that it was not
absolutely necessary for the taxpayer to show that such training was
customary. Instead, the court felt that the emphasis should be placed
on the primary purpose of the additional education. The court stated:
THE INITIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE

Watson33

Though the course was specialized, petitioner was not pursuing it for the purpose of fitting himself to engage in the
specialty. He continued to practice as an internist but with
skills presumably sharpened by his additional training in
analysis and psychiatric techniques. 6
Less than a year later Arnold Namrow, 37 one of the leading cases
in this area, came before the Tax Court. The two petitioners were
engaged in the practice of psychiatry. They enrolled in a psychoanalytic institute for training in the practice and theory of psychoanalysis. In addition to tuition and fees, they incurred expenditures
for a personal analysis and for the services of a supervising analyst.
The petitioners contended that this additional training was primarily undertaken to improve their skills as psychiatrists and should
be deductible as a business expense. The Commissioner argued that
331 T.C. 1014 (1959).
' This is the guideline set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1958).
s Four judges dissented without opinion.
3631 T.C. 1014, 1016 (1959). The court says the taxpayer comes under
example T.C.
(2) of
Reg. § 1.162-5(e) (1959).
419Treas.
(1959).
3733
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psychoanalysis is a medical specialty and not merely a technique of
psychiatric therapy and, therefore, the taxpayers were obtaining a new
specialty. A majority of the court disallowed the deduction and
stated that "the purpose of their attendance... was to obtain a new
or substantial advancement in position and the training they were
undertaking ... was to satisfy the minimum requirements for each
petitioner to establish himself as a practitioner in the special techflique of psychoanalysis." 38 The court pointed out that each student
at the institute promised not to hold himself out as a psychoanalyst
until so authorized by the institute and that most of the patients which
the taxpayers would treat by use of psychoanalysis would be referrals from colleagues at the institute. Thus, it would be unlikely
for a psychiatrist to establish a psychoanalytic practice unless he
attended the institute.
Five judges dissented on the ground that the facts showed
psychoanalysis to be merely an intensive form of psychotherapy, the
most common form of treatment used by psychiatrists. The dissenting judges felt that the expenses were incurred by the taxpayers to
maintain or improve their skills required in the practice of psychiatry
rather than to obtain a new specialty."9
The disallowance of the deduction was affirmed by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals40 on the ground that the findings of the Tax
Court were not so clearly erroneous as to compel a reversal.4" The
court rationalized that the true purpose and effect of an expense
governs its deductibility,4" and the court felt that the taxpayers expended money and time in order to secure recognition in the eyes of
their professional brethren as competent psychoanalysts. However,
8
1 d.at 434. The majority rejected the argument that the payments made
for services of supervising analysts were in effect consultation fees. They
held that these fees were incurred as a part of the required supervised clinical
work of the institute and any benefit which the patient received from them
was incidental.
" The dissenters would allow the deduction of the fees paid for supervising analysts as ordinary and necessary business expenses regardless of
whether or not all the expenses are deductible education costs.
"'Namrow v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 648 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 914 (1961). For a more recent case in accord where the taxpayer was
both a practicing psychiatrist and part-time teacher of psychiatry, see Grant
R. Gilmore, 38 T.C. No. 76 (1962).
"' Where there is sufficient evidence to support the lower court's position,
it will not be reversed unless the findings of fact are clearly untenable and
erroneous. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1960);
v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
United States
" Weiss v.Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
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while of no monetary benefit to the taxpayers, the court did conclude
that "the basic question of fact, whether psychoanalysis requires the
acquisition of a new skill or the improvement of one already possessed, still remains to be answered .

. . .""

Thus, the result seems

to rest upon the fact that psychoanalysis is in effect regarded as a
specialty "by a large body of medical opinion without whose approval
it cannot be successfully practiced." 44
Upon an examination of Watson and Namrow, a distinction,
though narrow in scope, can be seen. If the taxpayer is felt by
the court to be "running in place," i.e., maintaining his present
position, the deduction will be allowed. On the other hand, if the
court feels he has "taken a step upwards," i.e., obtained a new and
superior position, the deduction will be disallowed.
This distinction, although in line with the rule of Hill, appears
unharmonious with the supposed liberalization of the education expense deduction. When the new regulations were promulgated, the
Treasury Department reportedly stated that the new ruling would
cover the "cost of courses taken to keep one's skills on a par with
those of colleagues and competitors .

. . .""

This seems to recognize

the fact that in our modern day society a person cannot remain static
upon attaining the minimum requirements in his chosen occupation.
He must be constantly improving his knowledge, understanding, and
ability in his field of endeavor in order to keep up with changing
conditions. It appears that neither the Commissioner nor the courts
are adequately recognizing this factor in their application of the
regulations.
Also, when appraising this area of the tax law, it must be kept
in mind that most of the claims for deduction will be for relatively
small amounts, and the taxpayers will, in most instances, contest the
non-allowance of the deduction, if at all, without legal counsel. 40
Thus, the Commissioner's harsh application of his regulations and
288 F.2d 648, 652 (4th Cir. 1961).

"Id. at 653. The contention that the expenses were deductible as medi-

cal expenses was rejected unanimously by both the Tax Court and the
appellate tribunal.
"New York Times, April 4, 1958, p. 23, col. 8.
' The deduction is further minimized if the taxpayer is an employee as
distinguished from a self-employed individual. In the case of an employee,
the education expense deduction will be a deduction from adjusted gross
income and can be claimed only if the taxpayer does not elect the standard
deduction. See Hartrick v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ohio
1962); William E. Thompson, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 229 (1957).
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the strict view of the courts as exemplified by Namrow are making
it extremely difficult for the deduction to receive widespread use.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

From 1960 to the present, cases in this area have been coming
before the courts in rapid succession. In some cases it has been clear
that the taxpayer had incurred a non-deductible expense. 47 In
other instances the courts have adhered to the so-called "liberal
spirit" of the regulations and have allowed the deduction.4 s How"In Bernd W. Sandt, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 997 (1961), af'd, 303 F.2d
111 (3d Cir. 1962) and Roger A. Hines, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1123 (1961),
aff'd, 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962) the petitioners were research chemists.
They were promised jobs as patent chemists if they obtained a legal education.
The court reasoned that the primary purpose of the additional education was
to obtain a new position, and on this ground the deduction was denied.
It has been held that where government employees hold jobs which do
not require legal training, expenses incurred in obtaining a law degree will
not be allowed as a deduction. See James J. Engel, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1441 (1962); Louis Aronin, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 993 (1961).
See also Soloman Diamond, 1963 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (32
P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 63, 037; Ansis Mitrevics, 1963 P-H TAX CT. REP. &
MEM. DEC. (32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) § 63, 067; Frederick T. Simon, 31 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1072 (1962); Maude A. Schinnagel, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
638 (1962); James J. Condit, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1446 (1962); Daniel
Kates, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1545 (1962); Morris S. Schwartz, 30 P-H
Tax8 Ct. Mem. 795 (1961).
In Woodward W. Hartrick, 1963 P-H CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (32
P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 63,036, the taxpayer held a provisional teaching certificate and took courses to get the certificate renewed as required by the
school board. These courses also led towards a degree in elementary education, but the court refuted the contention of the Commissioner that the taxpayer was meeting the minimum requirements of her trade or business. The
court held that the taxpayer was already employed in her trade or business
and was undertaking the additional education to maintain her employment,
not to obtain it.
In James E. Lane, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1089 (1962), the taxpayer
took courses related to those which he taught even though they also led to
a master's degree. The court concluded that the primary purpose of the
expenditure was to improve the quality of the taxpayer's teaching with all
other motives being secondary and immaterial.
In Ruth Domigan Truxall, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1962), the
taxpayer, a teacher holding a permanent certificate, took a trip to Mexico.
She received semester hours credit for the trip, which additional credit was
needed in order that she could meet the schedule for annual advancements
that the school board had set up (i.e., she would have lost salary rights
had she not fulfilled this obligation although her certificate and job were not
in jeopardy).
In Peggy A. King, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 551 (1962), the taxpayer incurred expenses in quest of a Ph.D. degree. The taxpayer was a trained
social worker and was employed by the public school system in the field of
behavioral sciences. She obtained a leave of absence to pursue the Ph.D.
degree in education, and even though the taxpayer later abandoned the

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

ever, inconsistency on the part of the courts in applying the regulations has been significant.
In 1960 the Commissioner attempted to alleviate the problems
in this area by issuing Revenue Ruling 60-97."9 This ruling was an
effort to establish additional guidelines for the treatment of expenses
incurred for education. In regard to the allowance of the deduction
effort, the court felt that this work was undertaken primarily to maintain
and improve her skills in this field. The court also found from the evidence
that it was common and usual for people to obtain additional education in
this field.
In Elmer R. Johnson, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 641 (1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d
668 (9th Cir. 1963), the taxpayer had to take additional courses in order
to obtain a new emergency teaching certificate. The fact that these courses
helped her to later get a permanent certificate was held to be incidental by
the court.
In Smith v. United States, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1238 (N.D. Fla.
1961), the taxpayer took a trip to Europe and claimed 90% of her total costs
as a business expense. The taxpayer was a college teacher, and the jury
found that the trip was taken primarily to maintain and improve the skill
required by the taxpayer in her job.
In Michaelson v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Wash. 1961),
aff'd, 313 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1963), the taxpayer incurred expenses in taking
courses which allowed him to renew a provisional teaching certificate
although these courses also led to a permanent teaching certificate and a
Bachelor of Law degree.
In Laurie S. Robertson, 37 T.C. 1153 (1962), acq., 1963 INT. Rnv.
BULL. No. 8, at 7, the taxpayer incurred expenses in an effort to obtain a
Ph.D. degree although this goal was never achieved. The taxpayer was
hired as a college instructor and was reappointed annually for five years
at which time he was given a leave of absence to complete his Ph.D. The
current policy of the college was that tenure could not be granted until
he attained a Ph.D. degree. The court found as a fact that this policy
was enacted subsequent to the hiring of the petitioner and for this reason
rejected the Commissioner's contention that the job was originally taken
on a conditional basis. The court concluded that this educational requirement was imposed by the university as a condition upon the taxpayer for the
retention of his salary, status, and employment.
In Reuben B. Hoover, 35 T.C. 566 (1961), acq., 1961-2 Cum. BuLL. 4,
a partial deduction was allowed for costs incurred by the petitioner in going
on a "medical seminar cruise" although the trip was taken primarily for
pleasure. The court felt that the taxpayer did receive some professional
benefit from part of the trip which included medical lectures and discussions.
In Evelyn L. Sanders, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 364 (1960), a deduction
was allowed for expenses incurred by a teacher of art and geography in
taking a trip abroad. Approved traveling was one means of meeting a school
board requirement, and the board approved this trip. The court reasoned
that the petitioner's travel activities bore a logical relationship to the courses
which she taught and constituted a normal and natural response in light
of the school board's requirement.
See also Donald C. Hester, 1963 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. (32
P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 63,107; Lonnie R. Lenderman, 1963 P-H TAX CT.
63,110.
REP. & MEm. DEc. (32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.)
"a1960-1 Cum. BULL. 69.
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under the theory that the expense was incurred for the maintaining
and improving of skills, the ruling stated:
[I] t is necessary that the taxpayer show his purpose through
specific facts. In this connection it will be necessary for him
to establish that the education does maintain or improve skills
required in his employment or other business. The skills
"required" by the taxpayer in his employment or other trade
or business are those which are appropriate, helpful, or
needed.50
The most significant fault in this area today lies in the fact that
the courts are reluctant to place a proper interpretation on the last
preceding quoted sentence of the revenue ruling. This fault appears
to be the main reason for the inconsistency in the following illustrations.
In Evelyn Devereauxi the taxpayer was a university instructor
under a contract of permanent tenure. There was no requirement
that he undertake any additional studies leading to a Ph.D. degree
in his field. The facts, however, indicate that studies leading to a
Ph.D. degree were undertaken before the taxpayer was given a contract of permanent tenure in an effort to induce the university to renew his contract and secure his position. Since the Commissioner
could not argue that these expenses were incurred to meet the minimum requirements of the taxpayer's chosen profession, he contended
that they were incurred primarily for the purpose of attaining substantial advancement in position and an increase in salary. The Tax
Court agreed with the Commissioner's contention and disallowed
the deduction.5"
The petitioner in Devereaux acting as his own counsel on this
claim which totaled less than 2000 dollars, appealed the result of the
Tax Court and emerged with a victory.5 3 The Third Circuit recognized the fact that the regulations in this area are intended to be
liberally enforced. The court, however, based its reason for the
reversal on less than satisfactory grounds. The court indicated that
the taxpayer owed the university a "moral" obligation to continue
'0 Id. at 70. (Emphasis added.)
5'29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 509 (1960).

Quaere what the petitioner could have undertaken which would have

been any more appropriate and helpful in the teaching field.
" Devereaux v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1961).
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his studies leading to a Ph.D. degree in light of the fact that he used
this additional education as an inducement for renewal of his contract. Therefore, the court concluded that the taxpayer was maintaining his position by undertaking the studies, and that any promotion or salary increase as a result of attaining the Ph.D. degree
would be incidental.54 While the result seems correct, the court,
nevertheless, failed to recognize that a taxpayer may incur educational expenses in an attempt to "run-in-place" although such education leads to a doctorate degree and an advancement in salary.
In Joseph T. Booth, III" the petitioner, after attaining a law
degree and practicing for a short time, worked as an assistant legal
advisor to the Governor of Alabama. Later he and two other attorneys decided to open a practice together. He was designated to
attend New York University for the purpose of taking some tax
courses since it was agreed that none of the three partners-to-be
had enough knowledge in this field. The facts revealed that the taxpayer had not taken any tax courses in law school; that he had
handled no tax cases during the brief period in which he had practiced; and that he had not handled any tax matters while working
as advisor to the Governor of Alabama. The taxpayer contended
that the courses were taken primarily to improve skills which he
required in practicing his profession. On the other hand, the Commissioner argued that the expenses were incurred in order that the
taxpayer could acquire a new skill or specialty and obtain a new
-position. In disallowing the expenditures, the Tax Court concluded
that the primary purpose of the education was to enable the taxpayer
ito become a partner in the newly formed law firm.
Perhaps on the facts presented in Booth, the petitioner did
:fail the "primary purpose" test. For this reason the result appears
satisfactory. However, a more difficult question would have been
presented if the obtaining of a new position had not been a pertinent
factor. The Commissioner, assumedly, still would have attacked the
allowance of the deduction on the ground that the taxpayer was
acquiring a new skill or specialty. In light of Nairow the court
might agree with this position. But it is questionable whether this
attack would be a valid one in light of the regulations and Revenue
Ruling 60-97. Admittedly, the taxpayer had attained the minimum
r The court rejected the Commissioner's contended applicability of example (9) of Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 69, 77-78.
'35 T.C. 1144 (1961).
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requirements necessary for the practice of his profession. But it is
believed that the taking of tax law courses by an attorney is appropriate, helpful, and needed to improve and maintain his skills in the
legal field. It is suggested that the court should allow the deduction
in such a case if the regulations and Revenue Ruling 60-97 are interpreted in the proper light.
A case coming close to Booth on its facts and reaching a contrary result is Cosimo A. Carlucci.5" The taxpayer was employed
as an assistant research analyst in the field of industrial psychology
by an insurance company. He had attained several credit hours leading to a Ph.D. degree in industrial psychology, and in 1958 he took
nine additional credit hours towards this degree. It was not necessary for the retention of his job that he obtain this degree, nor was
it a prerequisite leading to a promotion, although over the long run
his chances of a promotion or a salary increase would obviously be
enhanced. The petitioner contended that it was necessary for him
"to keep abreast of current knowledge, literature, and thinking in the
field, and that his purpose in taking such courses was to accomplish
that result and to maintain and improve his standing, in terms of
knowledge, as an industrial psychologist . . . . 7 The Tax Court
looked to the fact that he had already met the minimum requirements
of qualification in his chosen field, and to the fact that many other
persons employed in psychological research by the taxpayer's employer, either had Ph.D. degrees or were doing work towards a
graduate degree. This latter fact indicated to the court that such
additional education was customary in this field. Thus, the Tax
Court in Carlucci appeared to make an effort to carry out the intended spirit of the regulations.
It was soon to be apparent that the thinking of the court in
Carlucci was predicated largely on the "custom" of the additional
education in the psychology field rather than on the more important
consideration that the education was appropriate,helpful, and needed.
This conclusion is substantiated by the result of the Tax Court in
Harold H. Davis.5" In this case the taxpayer was a college professor on permanent tenure and was not required to undertake any
additional scholarly duties in his field. However, the college did
37 T.C. 695 (1962).
Id. at 700-01.
38 T.C. 175 (1962), appeal docketed, No. 18188, 9th Cir., July 23,
1962.
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encourage its professors to engage in research and writing activities.
Accordingly, the petitioner took a trip to Europe for the purpose of
studying source material, unavailable in the United States, for a book
in his field which he desired to write. The majority held that the
expenses were voluntary and were undertaken so that the taxpayer
could increase his prestige as a scholar. It was concluded that the
expenses were incurred to acquire additional reputation and learning,
and thus cannot be classified as ordinary and necessary business
deductions.
Six judges dissented from the result of Davis. They felt that
the expenses could be classified as ordinary and necessary so long
as they were appropriateto the profession of the taxpayer. Clearly
the thinking of the dissent is correct if the regulations and Revenue
Ruling 60-97 are to be given meaningful interpretation."" If the view
of the dissent is not adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in its review of this case,"0 it will amount to a significant step in the
wrong direction. Certainly the facts of Davis fall within the guidelines which have been issued to help the taxpayers and the courts in
this area, i.e., the expenses were appropriate and helpful for the
maintenance of the taxpayer's skills.
CONCLUSION

Much progress has been made in this area since the Hill case in
1950. To a large extent this has been made possible by the willingness of the courts, except in Namrow and Davis, to apply the regulations in a liberal manner. The Commissioner, however, still seems
unwilling to "fall in step" with the intended spirit of the regulations. As a result of this, many taxpayers probably lose what should
be valid deductions due to the expense which would be involved in
attempting to litigate a small claim. The Commissioner's attitude
and attacks impair success of any attempt to forward education as the
" Dennehy v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1962), affirming
30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 821 (1961), involved facts very similar to those
in Davis. The taxpayer, a full time college math instructor, took a trip to
Europe during his sabbatical summer. The facts revealed that his activities
on this trip were no different from those of most tourists taking a European
trip. Both the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Tax Court denied
him a deduction for these expenses. It appears that there is a definite
factual distinction between Dennehty and Davis, and it is suggested that this
distinction is such that it was proper to deny Dennehy the deduction while
it was improper to treat Davis in the same manner.
" Appeal docketed, No. 18188, 9th Cir., July 23, 1962.
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means of professional improvement. Perhaps legislation in this
area will eventually be necessary if we are to attain such a goal.
In conclusion, the following statement of the district court judge
in Michaelson v. United States concerning the importance of this
deduction to the "little" taxpayer seems appropriate:
The importance of encouragement of individuals interested
in self-improvement should not be minimized. Certainly rapid
write-offs of investments in buildings, deductions for advertising and deductions for expenses in those higher brackets,
are no more important to them than a smaller deduction is to
one who has limited funds, as the taxpayer here."1
H.

ARTHUR SANDMAN

Conflict of Laws-Capacity to Sue-Which Law Should Govern?
It is generally accepted that the law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.1 In Shaw
v. Lee' this rule was applied to determine the capacity of one spouse
to sue the other. Plaintiff brought suit against her deceased husband's estate alleging that while riding through Virginia in an
automobile owned and operated by her husband, she was injured
in a collision between the automobile and a truck, and that the collision was caused by the joint and concurrent negligence of her husband and the truck driver. At the time of the injury plaintiff and
her husband were domiciled in North Carolina. The lower court
sustained defendant's demurrer to the complaint and on appeal the
supreme court affirmed. The court recognized that Virginia, unlike
North Carolina,' does not permit a married woman to sue her husband for injuries negligently inflicted.
Shaw v. Lee was not a case of first impression. It reaffirmed
North Carolina's previous position4 and is in accord with the mal1203 F. Supp. 830, 832-33 (E.D. Wash. 1961).
'Doss v. Sewell, 257 N.C. 404, 125 S.E.2d 899 (1962); Morse v. Walker,
229 N.C. 778, 51 S.E.2d 496 (1949); Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N.C. 286, 171
S.E. 82 (1933); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378.2 (1935); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-79 (1934); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 182
(2d ed. 1951).
2258

N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).

"'A husband and wife have a cause of action against each other to recover

damages sustained to their person or property as if they were unmarried.'

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 52-10.1 (Supp. 1961).

'Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931), is practically

